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Abstract—This paper investigates the impact of CAP 
subsidies  on  the  competitiveness  of  dairy  farms  in 
Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  Sweden.  Technical 
efficiency  results  show  that  coupled  subsidies  have 
negative impacts in Germany and the Netherlands, but 
no significant impacts in Sweden. Decoupled subsidies 
negatively affect technical efficiency in each country and 
to  a  larger  extent  than  coupled  subsidies.  Relative 
productivity results indicate that Dutch technology leads 
to  the  highest  output,  followed  by  technologies  in 
Germany and Sweden. Dutch farms can improve their 
competitiveness  by  exploring  their  current  production 
potential.  Besides  improving  efficiency,  German  and 
Swedish  farms  may  have  options  to  improve  their 
production technology. 
Keywords—  technical  efficiency,  output  distance 
function, dairy farm, subsidy, relative productivity. 
I. INTRODUCTION  
Dairy policy within the EU Common Agricultural 
Policy  (CAP)  is  complex  and  involves  many  policy 
instruments  such  as  price  support  programs  and 
various  subsidies.  Since  1992,  the  CAP  has  gone 
through three major reforms, which have changed the 
subsidy  policy  of  dairy  production  remarkably.  In 
1992, the MacSharry reform introduced a movement 
from price support to direct farm payments based on 
the  area  farmed  and  livestock  kept.  The  reform 
reduced  the  intervention  prices  for  butter  and  dairy 
products  by  9%  and  7.5%,  respectively  [1,  2].  The 
second  reform,  Agenda  2000,  expanded  the  shifts 
towards direct payments. Intervention prices for butter 
and  milk  powder  were  reduced  by  15%,  starting  in 
2005. The cuts were compensated by the introduction 
of  yearly  direct  payments  in  the  form  of  a  dairy 
premium  and  additional  payments  such  as  "top-up" 
premium and area payment [3]. In 2003, the Fischler 
reform  further  weakened  the  link  between  subsidies 
and  production.  Relative  to  Agenda  2000,  the 
intervention price cuts were brought forward one year, 
and  the  intervention  price  for  butter  was  further 
reduced  by  10%.  In  exchange,  the  compensation 
payments were increased. In short, the various CAP 
reforms  have  undergone  a  long  process  from  price 
support,  to  the  production-related  subsidies,  and 
eventually to the decoupled payments [4]. 
Various  agricultural  support  policies  influence 
optimal  decisions  through  different  mechanisms  [5]. 
The  impact  of  subsidies  on  the  farms’  economic 
performance  is  an  interesting  question  for  policy 
makers  who  want  to  evaluate  the  effects  of  their 
decisions [6]. Since the economic performance can be 
measured by efficiency and productivity measures [7], 
one  way  to  investigate  the  effects  of  EU’s  support 
policies  on  the  farms  economic  performance  is  to 
study  the  impact  of  CAP  subsidies  on  the  farms’ 
technical efficiency (TE). One may expect positive or 
negative  effects  of  subsidies  on  TE  under  different 
conditions.  On  the  one  hand,  subsidies  can  increase 
TE if they provide an incentive to innovate or switch 
to new technologies [8]. Subsidies may, on the other 
hand  decrease  technical  efficiency  if  higher  income 
from subsidies weakens the motivation in the form of 
slack or lack of effort [9]. Therefore, how much and in 
what  direction  the  CAP  subsidies  affect  farm-
performance is an empirical question. 
The  literature  provides  empirical  results  on  the 
effects of different support policies on TE in various 
agricultural  sectors.  First,  a  part  of  the  literature 
studies the effects of participation in subsidized credit 
programs. Taylor et al. [10] investigated the impact of 
credit programs subsidized by the World Bank on TE 
of Brazilian traditional farmers and found no effect. In 
contrast, Brümmer and Loy [11] and Rezitis et al. [12] 
showed that an EU subsidized farm credit program led 
to lower TE in the case of German dairy farms and 
various  Greek  farms,  respectively.  Second,  some 
studies investigate the effects of governmental direct 
subsidies. In the case of Russian farms, Sotnikov [13] 
found that farms that still face soft budget constraints 
are  less  efficient.  For  Canadian  wheat  farms, 
Giannakas  et  al.  [14]  showed  that  government 
payments  were  associated  with  lower  efficiency   2 
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scores,  and  similar  results  were  obtained  by  Bojnec 
and Latruffe [15] in the case of Slovenian farms. On 
the contrary, no significant impact of state subsidies 
on  TE  of  Russian  corporate  farms  was  found  by 
Grazhdaninova and Lerman [16]. The third group of 
studies considers the impacts of CAP direct payments. 
A negative relation was found for Spanish beef farms 
[17],  Hungarian  mixed  farms  [18],  several  types  of 
English  and  Welsh  farms  [19],  and  Spanish  and 
German farms [20]. Hadley [19], however, also found 
a  positive  effect  in  the  case  of  dairy  and  beef 
producers.  The  analysis  of  Guyomard  et  al.  [21] 
indicated that CAP direct payments led to lower TE 
for  crop,  beef,  and  dairy farms  in  France;  however, 
they also found that the subsidies positively influenced 
the technical efficiency change (TEC) over time. 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  twofold.  First,  we 
investigate  the  effects  of  different  types  of  CAP 
subsidies together with other exogenous variables on 
technical  efficiency  and  technical  efficiency  change. 
The empirical study focuses on unbalanced panel data 
from  German,  Dutch  and  Swedish  specialized  dairy 
farms  over  the  period  1995-2004.  Stochastic  output 
distance  function  are  estimated  for  each  country  in 
order  to  analyse  TE  and  TEC  and  the  impact  of 
coupled  and  decoupled  subsidies  within  countries 
Second,  we  compare  the  existing  production 
technologies of the three countries by performing an 
analysis  of  their  relative  productivity.  The  applied 
approach  is  similar  to  the  derivation  of  inter-firm 
catch-up component used by Oude Lansink et al. [22]. 
We  calculate  the  ratios  of  predicted  output  of  each 
country  using  its  own  production  technology  to  the 
predicted output using the production technologies of 
the other countries. The ratios reveal a given country’s 
performance  over  time  relative  to  the  “best  practice 
frontier”, thereby indicating the improvement potential 
that  might  be  realized  by  adopting  the  theoretically 
best  available  technology  in  the  three  countries.  In 
short, this paper provides comparable information on 
the  performance  of  farms  operating  under  a  given 
technology  in  different  EU  countries.  Productivity, 
which is implicitly related to technical efficiency, is a 
determinant  of  overall  competitiveness  [23]. 
Therefore,  the  analysis  of  farm  efficiency  and  the 
comparison  of  production  technologies  across 
countries provide insights into the competitiveness of 
farms  and  their  potential  for  improving  productivity 
and resource use [24]. 
The  paper  proceeds  as  follows.  In  section  2,  we 
present  the  theoretical  framework  of  the  stochastic 
frontier  analysis  in  the  form  of  output  distance 
function  and  the  inefficiency  effects  model.  This  is 
followed  by  a  discussion  of  the  empirical  model 
specification for dairy farms in section 3. Section 4 
describes  the  data  and  the  statistics  of  the  model 
variables and section 5 presents the results.  Section 6 
concludes. 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
A. Theoretical Background on the Effects of Subsidies 
The  2003  CAP  reforms  entail  a  decoupling  of 
subsidies  from  farm  production,  meaning  that 
subsidies  based  on  production  quantity  are 
transformed  into  lump  sum  payments.  Decoupled 
payments  are  lump-sum  income  transfers  to  farm 
operators  that  do  not  depend  on  their  current 
production  but  on  their  historic  entitlements  with 
obligations of keeping their land in good agricultural 
and  environmental  conditions.  The  actual  effects  of 
subsidies  on  a  producer’s  performance  are  complex 
and have led to a large number of studies in the field. 
A stream of literature hypothesises that coupled and 
decoupled  subsidies  have  an  income  effect  in  the 
presence of uncertainty. If farmers are risk averse, any 
measures that reduce risk or increase income will have 
effects on production [25]. Hennessy [5] showed that 
decoupled policies affect the decisions of risk-averse 
producers in the presence of uncertainty. The impact 
of income support on farm’s production decisions can 
be  attributed  to  an  income  effect  and  an  insurance 
effect. Due to the presence of risk and uncertainty in 
agricultural  production,  the  income-stabilizing  effect 
of  income  support  policy  against  risk  may  affect 
optimal decisions, i.e. the insurance effect. Burfisher 
and  Hopkins  [26]  found  that  decoupled  payments 
improved the wellbeing of recipient farm households 
by  enabling  them  to  comfortably  increase  spending, 
savings,  investments,  and  leisure  with  minimal 
distortions of agricultural production and trade. 
Second, subsidies can affect production through the 
impact  of  income  on  off-farm  and  on-farm  labour   3 
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supply  [27].  That  is,  the  income  from  subsidies 
changes  the  time  allocated  to  farming.  Findeis  [28] 
showed  in  a  theoretical  model  that  income  transfers 
reduce total working time, caused by an increase in 
affordability  of  home  time.  Woldehanna  et  al.  [29] 
found  that  decreased  price  support  in  combination 
with direct income support is most likely to increase 
off-farm employment of arable farm households in the 
Netherlands. El-Osta et al. [30] found a positive effect 
of decoupled payments on on-farm labour supply, and 
thus on production. Serra et al. [31] showed that the 
decoupling associated with the 1996 US agricultural 
policy  reform  reduced  the  likelihood  of  off-farm 
labour  participation.  Similarly,  Ahearn  et  al.  [32] 
found that government payments, whether coupled or 
decoupled, have a negative effect on off-farm labour 
participation. Ooms [33], however, does not find an 
effect  of  decoupled  payments  on  on-  and  off-farm 
labour supplies and production. 
Third, subsidies can affect performance through an 
effect on financial variables such as debt, solvability 
and  liquidity.  Those  financial  factors  influence 
investment  decisions,  thereby  affecting  farms’ 
production  potential  in  the  long  run  [33,  34,  35]. 
Gardebroek  [36]  found  that  capital  adjustment  costs 
are  an  important  determinant  in  investments  in 
buildings for Dutch pig farms. Bezlepkina et al. [37] 
found that subsidies affect the input-output mix and 
have a positive impact on the allocative efficiency and 
profit  of  Russian  dairy  farms.  Zhengfei  and  Oude 
Lansink [38] studied the impacts of financial strategies 
and  subsidies  on  the  productivity  of  Dutch  arable 
farms  and  found  a  positive  effect  of  debt  and  a 
negative effect of subsidies on productivity growth. 
Another stream of literature links subsidies to the 
production  decisions  on  farm  growth  and  exit.  A 
policy that has effects on farmers’ income could affect 
entry  and  exit  decisions  and  farm  growth  decisions, 
[33, 39, 40]. Ahearn et al. [39] found that commodity 
payments reduced the share of small farms, increased 
the share of large farms and increased farm exits in the 
period 1982-96 in US. By contrast, Pietola et al. [41] 
found  that  changes  in  income  subsidy  rates  did  not 
significantly affect farm closures in Finland. The study 
of Chau and de Gorter [42] found that the removal of 
decoupled payments can have a relatively large impact 
on exit decisions of low-profit farm units. 
Yet  another  stream  of  literature  link  decoupled 
subsidies to market imperfections and input allocation. 
Moschini and Sckokai [43] found that a decoupling of 
subsidies  is  usually  desirable  even  in  a  distorted 
economy in which lump-sum taxation is not feasible. 
Serra  et  al.  [44]  showed  that  partially  decoupled 
compensatory payments introduced by the 1992 CAP 
reform intensified production practices by stimulating 
an  increase  in  the  use  of  inputs  such  as  pesticides. 
Goodwin and Mishra [40] found that decoupled farm 
payments  have  only  modest  effects  on  the  acreage 
allocation  and  the  production  decisions  because 
payments tends to make producers less likely to idle or 
waste land. 
B. Output Distance Function and Inefficiency Effects 
Model 
Assume that production technology is defined by an 
output  set  Y(x),  representing  the  vector  of  outputs 
M y R+ Î   that  can  be  produced  by  an  input  vector 
N x R+ Î ,  i.e.  ( ) { : canproduce }
M Y x y R x y + = Î .  The 
output  distance  function  is  defined  as 
( , ) min{ : / ( )} O D x y y Y x q q = Î . DO(x, y), and is non-
decreasing,  positively  linearly  homogenous  and 
convex in y, and decreasing in x [45]. The value of the 
distance function is less than or equal to one for all 
feasible output vectors. On the outer boundary of the 
production  possibilities  set,  the  value  of  DO(x,  y)  is 
one. Thus, the output distance function indicates the 
potential radial expansion of production to the frontier.  
The  output  distance  function  is  by  definition 
linearly homogenous in outputs, which is imposed by 
dividing all outputs by one of the outputs. Technical 
change  being  represented  by  a  time  trend  t, 
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where  it u   is  a  non-negative  random  error  term 
representing  the  time-varying  technical  inefficiency   4 
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and  independently  distributed  ) , (
2
u it z N s d
+ .  The 
output-oriented technical efficiency is calculated as 








it y x D u TE = - =
- .    (2) 
There  are  different  factors  that  can  explain  the 
technical efficiency differences amongst firms. These 
factors  are  exogenous  variables,  which  are  neither 
inputs  to  the  production  process  nor  outputs  of  the 
firm,  but  which  nonetheless  exert  an  influence  on 
producer’s  performance.  One  of  the  approaches 
assumes  that  the  exogenous  factors  influence  the 
degree  of  technical  inefficiency  and  hence  these 
factors are modelled directly in the inefficiency term. 
The basic model is based on Kumbhakar et al. [48]  
and  Battese  and  Coelli  [49].  It  is  assumed  that  the 
s uit'   are  non-negative  random  variables  reflecting 
firm-specific  and  time-specific  deviations  from  the 
frontier, associated with the technical inefficiency of 
production. In equation (1),  it u  is specified as  
it it it w z u + = d ,        (3) 
where  it z  is a vector of firm-specific time-varying J 
variables  (called  explanatory  variables  or  exogenous 
factors) exogenous to the production process, and d  is 
an unknown vector of J parameters to be estimated. 
The error term  it w ~ N(0, 
2
w s ) is truncated from below 
by the variable truncation point  d it z - . The frontier 
model (1) with inefficiency effects model (3) allows 
for  a  simultaneous  estimation  of  the  impact  of 
different  factors  that  determine  technical  efficiency. 
The  technical  efficiency  (TE)  corresponding  to  the 
production frontier model and inefficiency effects is 
defined as 
} exp{ ) exp( it it it it w z u TE - - = - = d .   (4) 







- = . Taking the derivative of the definition of 
technical efficiency (i.e.  } exp{ it it u TE - = ) with respect 
to t, it is not difficult to obtain a general form of the 














1 .    (5) 
Clearly,  technical  inefficiency  or  technical 
efficiency is explained by a set of specified exogenous 
variables (vector z) and the error term w captures the 
influences  of  the  other  unspecified  factors  in  the 
stochastic frontier model (equation 4). In a dynamic 
environment  these  exogenous  variables  are  also 
changing over time. Therefore, the technical efficiency 
change in (5) can also be explained by the change of 
z   variables.  We  decompose  technical  efficiency 
change  (TEC)  into  the  change  attributable  to  the  z 
variables and the unspecified factors (w). From (4) and 
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III. EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
A. Model Specification 
 
This study employs a Translog specification of the 
output  distance  function.  The  Translog  provides  an 
attractive framework for estimating stochastic frontier 
models  allows  for  a  more  flexible  functional  form 
representation  of  the  technology  than  the  Cobb-
Douglas. 
The vector of outputs 
M y R+ Î  and each output is 
indexed by m or n, m or n=1, 2, …, M. The vector of 
inputs 
N x R+ Î   and each input is indexed by j or k, j or 
k=1,  2,  …,  N.    The  vector  of  exogenous  variables 
J R zÎ and each variable is indexed by p, p=1, 2, …, 
J.  Homogeneity of output distance function in outputs 
is imposed by dividing all outputs by the quantity of a 
numeraire  output  [46].  This  leads  to  the  following 
specification for the i-th firm:   5 
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p it it it w z w z u + + = + = ∑
=1
0 d d d .   (8) 
The  distributions  of  the  error  terms  in  the  above 
model  have  the  assumptions:  i.e. ) , 0 ( ~
2
v it N iid v s , 
) , ( ~
2
u it it z N u s d
+   and  )    (0, ~
2
w s N wit .  The  output 
distance  function  (7)  and  the  inefficiency  effects 
model (8) account for both technical change and time-
varying  inefficiency  effects.  Using  it it it u v - = e   in 
equation (7), the output-oriented technical efficiency is 
estimated as 
] ) [exp( it it
O O u E TE
it e - =
- .      (9) 
The  marginal  effect  of  each  exogenous  variable 
( p z ) on technical efficiency can be calculated from:  
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1. 
                                                            
1. We can also use the marginal effect of exogenous variables on 






¶ ) (  (see equation 9 of [51]) to 
obtain  the  marginal  effect  on  technical  efficiency.  Using  the 
definition  of  technical  efficiency: 
)] ( exp[ ] ) [exp( it it it it u E u E TE - = - = e , we obtain the marginal 
  We  use  a  slightly  different  expression  for  the 
technical efficiency change of (6) in a discrete time 
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Technical  efficiency  change  can  be  further 
decomposed into: 
it it J it it
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to   the  contribution  of  unspecified 
factors to the technical efficiency change. 
 
B. Relative Productivity 
 
The  output  distance  function  in  (7)  and  (8)  is 
estimated for the Netherlands, Sweden and Germany 
separately.  The  estimates  of  the  output  distance 
function  can  be  used  to  make  a  comparison  of  the 
relative productivity of dairy farms in these countries. 
The output distance function can be written as 
  o it it it it D y y x f y ln ) , , ( ln 1 1 + = b ,    (13) 
or, 
) , , ( ) ln( 1
1 b it it it
o
it y y x f
D
y
= .      (14) 
Note  that  smaller  values  of  Do  indicate  closer 
proximities  to  the  frontier  and  a  higher  value  of 
( ) o it D y1 ln .  The  deterministic  part  of  the  output 
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distance  function,  i.e.  ) , , ( 1 b it it it y y x f ,  provides  a 
measure of the production potential in each country. In 
the analysis of the relative productivity, the output can 
be predicted for each country using its own technology 
and  the  predicted  outputs  using  the  technologies  of 
other countries. If the output under its own technology 
is higher than the outputs from technologies in other 
countries, this specific country is more productive than 
its counterparts. 
IV. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Data from specialised dairy farms over the period 
1995-2004  are  obtained  from  the  European 
Community’s  Farm  Accounting  Data  Network 
(FADN). The FADN database contains mainly input 
expenditures  and  output  revenues.  Price  indexes  of 
agricultural products are obtained from EUROSTAT 
and are used to calculate Tornqvist price indexes for 
the aggregate inputs and outputs. Next, we compute 
implicit  input  and  output  quantities  as  the  ratios  of 
values to the price indexes. 
We  distinguish  two  outputs  (milk  and  other 
outputs),  one  variable  input  and  three  factor  inputs 
(capital, labour and land). Descriptive statistics for the 
data  for  each  country  are  shown  in  Table  1. 
Information on livestock subsidies and total subsidies 
are found in Appendix 1.  
Exogenous  variables  which  may  influence  farm 
efficiency  include  management  strategies  (e.g. 
financial management), environmental factors (such as 
location  and  specialization),  and  socio-economic 
factors (e.g. public policies) [17, 52]. The list of the 
explanatory  variables  is  shown  in  Table  2.  The 
explanatory  variables  include  different  types  of 
subsidies,  farm  size,  management  related  variables 
(degree of specialization, labour use and land use) and 
financial management related variables. Furthermore, 
regional  differences  may  play  a  role  in  explaining 




Table 1 Descriptive statistics of outputs and inputs of dairy 
farms in Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden  
  Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   Min   Max 
Germany
a 
Milk (€)  90888  58662  13252  413046 
Other 
products 
(€)  32810  19991  4347  136177 
Variable 
inputs (€)  73470  43791  6868  438746 
Capital (€)  2825  4385  337  458499 
Labour 
(hrs)  4036  1950  2186  31910 




Milk (€)  159668  87422  11563  525867 
Other 
products 
(€)  42355  39276  3776  311657 
Variable 
inputs (€)   102330  52922  16698  467700 
Capital(€)  4168  2441  425  31308 
Labour 
(hrs)  4362  1656  756  13149 




Milk (€)  97128  106332  184  1407383 
Other 
products 
(€)  36363  45217  150  501265 
Variable 
inputs (€)   91446  95277  3876  1431048 
Capital  (€)  3238  2916  176  33010 
Labour 
(hrs)  4468  2398  500  36756 
Land (ha)  84  84  4  1119 
         
a Based on 2845 farms and 12458 observations in 1995-2004 
b Based on 696 farms and 3223 observations in 1995-2004 
c Based on 597 farms and 3341 observations in 1995-2004 
 
The available data on the period under investigation 
did not contain information on coupled and decoupled 
subsidies. Therefore, two explanatory variables were 
constructed to account for the impact of coupled and 
decoupled subsidies on technical efficiency. First, note 
that  the  data  are  on  specialised  dairy  farms,  so  the 
share  of  livestock  subsidies  in  total  subsidies  is 
assumed  to  mimic  the  impact  of  coupled  subsidies. 
Livestock subsidies provided by the EU are directly 
related to production activities. Second, the share of 
total  subsidies  in  total  farm  revenue  is  assumed  to 
reflect the impact of decoupled subsidies. The impact   7 
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of  coupled  subsidies  is  already  controlled,  so  this 
variable captures the effect of those subsidies that are 
not directly related to production. 
 
Table 2 Explanatory variables in the inefficiency effects 
model and their definitions 
Variable name  Definition 
   
Coupled subsidies  Livestock subsidies in total subsidies 
(%) 
Total subsidies  Total subsidies in total revenue (%) 
Farm size  Farm size in terms of European size 
units (ESU) 
Degree of specialisation   Milk production in total production 
(%) 
Family labour   Family labour in total labour (%) 
Rented land  Rented land in total utilised land (%) 
Long term debt  Long and intermediate run loans in 
total assets (%) 
Short term debt  Short run loans to total assets (%) 
Time trend  Time=1 for 1995, time=10 for 2004 
Regional dummies  12 dummies for Germany and 2 
dummies for Sweden 
 
  Farm  size  captures  the  impact  of  economies  or 
(diseconomies) of scale which may partly materialise 
through a higher (lower) technical efficiency. Degree 
of  specialisation  captures  any  advantages  related  to 
specialisation such as economies of scale in a single 
production  activity  and  knowledge.  The  share  of 
family  labour  in  total  labour  may  positively  affect 
technical efficiency if family labour is more motivated 
or better skilled.  Rented land reflects the impact of 
ownership  as  an  additional  incentive  to  produce 
efficiently.  Finally,  long-  and  short-term  debt  may 
have a positive effect on technical efficiency if they 
provide a disciplinary role [38].  
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
A. Technical efficiency 
 
The  estimations  of  output  distance  function  and 
inefficiency  effects  model  for  dairy  farms  in  three 
individual  countries  (Germany,  Netherlands  and 
Sweden)  are  shown  in  Appendix  2.  Technical 
efficiency and technical efficiency change are shown 
in Table 3. Furthermore, the marginal effects of the 
exogenous  variables  on  technical  efficiency  are 
presented in Table 4. 
 
Table  3  Technical  efficiency  (TE)  and  technical 
efficiency change (TEC) of dairy farms 
  Germany  Netherlands  Sweden 
Year   TE  TEC  TE  TEC  TE  TEC 
1995  0.546   -  0.468  -  0.827  - 
1996  0.544  0.002  0.469  0.015  0.838  -0.011 
1997  0.574  0.051  0.508  0.062  0.798  -0.056 
1998  0.583  0.014  0.533  0.050  0.800  -0.001 
1999  0.615  0.030  0.578  0.082  0.771  -0.029 
2000  0.638  0.025  0.557  -0.042  0.793  0.022 
2001  0.604  -0.029  0.590  0.063  0.767  -0.032 
2002  0.606  0.017  0.598  0.008  0.764  0.002 
2003  0.610  0.000  0.627  0.042  0.782  0.032 
2004  0.604  -0.003  0.614  -0.008  0.759  -0.036 
Average  0.594  0.010  0.552  0.028  0.788  -0.011 
 
The mean technical efficiency of the dairy farms 
in  1995-2004  is  59%  in  Germany,  55%  in  the 
Netherlands, and 79% in Sweden. The mean TE scores 
show an increasing trend for both Germany and the 
Netherlands, while average TE decreased in Sweden 
between  1995  and  2004.  These  trends  are  also 
indicated by the average technical efficiency change 
results. 
The  marginal  effects  of  exogenous  variables 
(Table  4)  show  that  the  coupled  livestock  subsidies 
have negative impact on technical efficiency of dairy 
farms in Germany and Netherlands, but no significant 
impact in Sweden, while the decoupled subsidies have 
a significant negative impact on technical efficiency in 
each  of  the  three  countries.  This  suggests  that  the 
motivation  of  farmers  to  work  efficiently  is  lower 
when farmers have extra income [9]. Furthermore, the 
results are in line with those of Iraizoz et al., Bakucs et 
al. and Guyomard et al. [17, 18, 21]. Moreover, as it 
can be seen in Table 4, that a 1% increase of the share 
of coupled subsidies in total subsidies causes a 0.03% 
and  0.02%  decrease  of  TE  in  Germany  and 
Netherlands,  respectively. An  increase  of  1%  of  the 
share of total subsidies in total farm revenues leads to 
a  1.05%,  0.82%  and  0.89%  decrease  of  TE  in 
Germany, Netherlands and Sweden, respectively. This 
implies that the composition of subsidies (i.e. the share 
of coupled subsidies) has a much smaller effect on TE   8 
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than  a  change  in  the  composition  of  total  revenues 
(share of total subsidies). This result is of significant 
importance for the 2003 CAP reforms which entail a 
shift  towards  decoupled  (direct)  payments  and  are 
expected to increase the share of total subsidies in total 
farm revenues. 
 
Table 4 Marginal effects of exogenous variables 
on Technical Efficiency 
  Germany Netherlands Sweden
Coupled subsidies  -0.00027 -0.00024 0
Total subsidies  -0.01049 -0.00824 -0.00888
Farm size  0.00225 0.00161 0.00137
Specialization  0.0047 0.00473 0.00143
Family labour  -0.00045 0.00025 -0.0003
Rented land  0.00022 -0.00014 0.00037
Long term debt  -0.00005 0.00033 -0.00014
Short term debt  -0.00027 -0.00171 -0.00025
Time  0.00119 0.01801 -0.00161
 
Table 4 also shows that results for German and 
Swedish farms have a similar pattern, that is, larger 
size, a larger degree of specialization, a lower share of 
family  labour  and  more  rented  land,  and  lower 
indebtedness  increase  technical  efficiency.  By 
contrast,  on  Dutch  dairy  farms,  the  share  of  family 
labour  and  long  term  debts  increase  technical 
efficiency  whereas  and  the  share  of  rented  land 
decreases  technical  efficiency.  The  differences 
coincide  with  the  fact  that  the  studied  samples  of 
German  and  Swedish  farms,  relative  to  their  Dutch 
counterparts, employ less family labour, utilize more 
rented land, and have lower proportion of long-term 
debts. Time trend shows positive effect in Germany 
and Netherlands but a negative effect in Sweden. This 
could be explained by the fact that Sweden joined to 
the EU in 1995, and the subsidies received after 1995 
were  more  shocking  to  the  production  and  had 
negative impact on TE over time. 
Technical efficiency changes differently over time 
in the three countries. The mean annual TEC (Table 3) 
between  1995  and  2004  is  1.0%,  2.8%  and  -1.1% 
respectively  for  Germany,  Netherlands  and  Sweden. 
That is, technical efficiency of dairy farms in Germany 
and  the  Netherlands  on  average  improves,  whereas 
technical  efficiency  of  dairy  farms  in  Sweden 
decreases. 
The  contributions  of  the  specified  exogenous 
variables  and  the  other  unspecified  variables  to  the 
technical efficiency change are presented in Table 5. 
For Germany, the improvement of technical efficiency 
(1.0%)  is,  on  average  mainly  attributable  to  the 
specified variables in the time period of 1995-2004. In 
Netherlands,  the  mean  TEC  (2.8%)  is  also  mainly 
(3.3%) due to changes in the specified variables and -
0.5%  of  the  unspecified  factors.  In  Sweden,  the 
contribution of the specified variables to the average 
technical efficiency change (-1.1%) is -1.4%, whereas 
that of the unspecified factors is 0.3%. 
 
Table 5 Contributions of specified variables and 
unspecified factors to Technical Efficiency Change 
Germany Netherlands Sweden
Specified variables  
Coupled subsidies  -0.002 -0.003 0
Total subsidies  -0.007 -0.007 -0.011
Farm size  0.013 0.004 0.006
Specialization  0.003 0.005 -0.005
Family labour  0 0 0
Rented land  0 0 0
Long term debt  0 -0.001 0
Short term debt  0 0 0
Time  0.002 0.035 -0.004
Total  specified 
variables  0.010 0.033 -0.014
Unspecified factors   0 -0.005 0.003
TEC  0.010 0.028 -0.011
 
 
  Considering  the  effects  of  the  specified 
variables  on  technical  efficiency  change  over  time, 
similar  results  were  found  for  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands.  Both  coupled  livestock  subsidies  and 
total subsidies have contributed negatively to technical 
efficiency change, while farm size and specialization 
degree had positive effects. Moreover, in the case of 
the  Dutch  farms,  the  changes  in  long  term  debts 
decreased  TE  over  the  studied  period.  Furthermore, 
time contributes positively to the technical efficiency 
change in Germany and the Netherlands. In Sweden, 
the average decrease of TE is largely due to negative 
effects of an increased share of total subsidies in total   9 
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farm  revenues  and  to  a  decreasing  degree  of 
specialization and an autonomous technical efficiency 
change. These negative effects were slightly lowered 
by the positive effects of an increase in the average 
farm size. 
In  each  of  the  three  countries  the  share  of 
livestock subsidies in total subsidies and the share of 
total subsidies in total farm revenue increased in the 
period  1995-2004.  The  increased  shares  of  coupled 
and total subsidies had a negative impact on technical 
efficiency in each of the three countries. Our findings 
are not in line with those of Guyomard et al. [21], who 
found a positive contribution of CAP direct payments 
to the change of TE for various French farms. 
  The discussion on the technical efficiency change 
and the decomposition so far is based on the 10-year 
average  rate  of  the  technical  efficiency  change. 
Technical efficiency change is fluctuating over time, 
being  positive  in  some  years  but  negative  in  other 
years.  That  is,  there  is  positive  technical  efficiency 
change in some years but negative in some other years 
due to the fact that values of exogenous variables, e.g. 
the subsidies received are changing over time under 
the  different  CAP  reforms,  and  the  farm  size  and 
specialization degree in dairy farms are also changing. 
We  may  explain  this  trend  of  technical  efficiency 
change  with  the  change  of  subsidies  received.  For 
example,  the  total  subsidies  in  1999  and  2000  in 
Germany  are  the  lowest  (see  Appendix  1),  which 
results in the highest technical efficiency (0.615 and 
0.638)  and  technical  efficiency  change  (0.030  and 
0.025).  This again  confirms  the  negative  impacts  of 
the  total  subsidies  on  the  technical  efficiency  and 
technical efficiency change. 
 
B. Relative productivity 
In  Table  6,  we  present  the  average  relative 
productivity indicators. The indicators in Table 6 are 
computed by inserting the inputs used in one country 
in  the  production  frontier  of  each  of  the  three 
countries. The value obtained in this way is divided by 
the value of the frontier output obtained from the own 




Table 6 Mean values of the relative productivity ratios 
  German  Dutch  Swedish 
German farms  1.000 1.042 0.872
Dutch farms  0.973      1.000      0.849
Swedish farms 1.158      1.207      1.000
 
In contrast to the technical efficiency results, the 
three countries rank opposite in terms of the relative 
productivity.  That  is,  on  average  for  a  given  set  of 
total inputs the Dutch production technology resulted 
in the highest total output, followed by the German 
and  Swedish  technologies.  More  specifically,  the 
productivity  of  German  dairy  farms  would  be,  on 
average,  4.2%  higher  if  these  farms  would  use  the 
production  technology  of  dairy  farms  in  the 
Netherlands.  Output  of  German  dairy  farms  would 
decrease  by  12.8%  if  they  had  used  the  Swedish 
production  technology.  Regarding  the  Dutch  farms, 
the output using their own technology is on average 
higher  than  using  the  alternative  technologies 
available  in  the  other  countries.  In  Sweden,  dairy 
farms  are  relatively  less  productive  than  their 
counterparts  in  both  Germany  and  the  Netherlands. 
Swedish productivity could be improved by 15.8% or 
20.7%  when  using  the  German  or  the  Dutch 
production technology, respectively. 
  Therefore,  competitiveness  can  be  improved  in 
different  ways  in  the  three  countries.  For  German 
dairy farmers, there is a theoretical scope to increase 
their  productivity  by  improving  their  production 
technology.  In  addition,  it  is  also  important  in 
Germany  to  improve  technical  efficiency  as  the 
average  farms  are  technically  not  very  efficient 
(59.4%)  relative  to  the  best-practiced  farm  (98.3%) 
within  the  country.  In  the  Netherlands, 
competitiveness  can  be  primarily  increased  by 
improving  technical  efficiency  with  the  available 
production  technology.  Among  the  countries,  the 
average  TE  in  the  Netherlands  scored  the  lowest 
(55.2%) relative to the country’s own potential output. 
In  the  case  of  Sweden,  the  actual  production 
technology  is  utilized  efficiently  (78.8%)  relative  to 
the  other  countries;  however,  there  is  certainly  a 
potential for improving the productivity.   10 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The  objective  of  this  empirical  study  was  to 
investigate  the  impact  of  coupled  and  decoupled 
subsidies  on  the  competitiveness  of  dairy  farms 
operating in three EU member countries. Furthermore, 
a  comparison  of  production  technologies  across 
countries  was  made.  The  empirical  framework  was 
applied to panel data of German, Swedish and Dutch 
dairy farms over the period 1995-2004. 
In  the  period  1995-2004,  average  technical 
efficiency  is  59%  in  Germany,  55%  in  the 
Netherlands,  and  79%  in  Sweden.  These  results 
indicate the countries’ potential in improving resource 
use relative to the optimum of their own production 
technology.  Investigating  the  effects  of  exogenous 
variables on technical efficiency suggests that coupled 
livestock subsidies have negative impacts on technical 
efficiency  of  dairy  farms  in  both  Germany  and  the 
Netherlands,  but  no  significant  impacts  in  Sweden. 
Decoupled  subsidies  negatively  affect  technical 
efficiency in each country. Importantly, an increase in 
the  share  of  decoupled  subsidies  has  a  much  larger 
negative effect on technical efficiency than an increase 
in  the  share  of  coupled  subsidies  in  total  subsidies. 
Results  also  show  that  average  annual  change  of 
technical  efficiency  is  1.0%,  2.8%  and  -1.1% 
respectively  for  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and 
Sweden,  respectively.  The  shares  of  coupled  and 
decoupled  subsidies  increased  in  the  period  under 
investigation and caused a substantial negative effect 
on the change in technical efficiency in each of the 
three countries. The 2003 CAP reforms are expected 
to  increase  the  share  of  decoupled  subsidies  and  to 
decrease the share of coupled subsidies. The results of 
this study suggest a negative impact from the increase 
of  total  subsidies  in  total  revenues  (decoupled 
subsides)  and  a  small  positive  impact  from  the 
decrease of the share of livestock subsidies (coupled 
subsidies). 
The  results  of  the  comparison  of  different 
production technologies indicate that on average the 
Dutch production technology leads to the highest total 
output from a given set of total inputs, followed by 
production  technologies  in  Germany  and  Sweden. 
Therefore, the overall competitiveness of dairy farms 
in the Netherlands can be improved by operating more 
efficiently  under  the  given  technology.  For  the 
German  and  Swedish  counterparts,  however,  in 
principle there is a potential to improve productivity, 
in  addition  to  improving  their  technical  efficiency. 
Future empirical research is needed to gain insight to 




1.  Folmer,  C.,  M.  A.  Keyzer,  M.  D.  Merbis,  H.  J.  J. 
Stolwijk, and P. J. J. Veenendaal (1995) The common 
agricultural  policy  beyond  the  MacSharry  reform. 
North-Holland Elsevier, Amsterdam. 
2.  Ingersent, K. A., A. J. Rayner, and R. C. Hine (1998) 
The  reform  of  the  common  agricultural  policy.  St. 
Martin's Press, New York. 
3.  Benjamin, C., A. Gohin, and H. Guyomard (1999) The 
future of the European Union dairy policy. Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 47(5):91-101. 
4.  Swinbank, A. and C. Daugbjerg (2006) The 2003 CAP 
Reform:  Accommodating  WTO  Pressures. 
Comparative European Politics. 4(1):47-64. 
5.  Hennessy,  D.  A.  (1998)  The  Production  Effects  of 
Agricultural  Income  Support  Policies  under 
Uncertainty.  American  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics. 80(1):46. 
6.  Bauer, P. W., A. N. Berger, G. D. Ferrier, and D. B. 
Humphrey  (1998)  Consistency  Conditions  for 
Regulatory  Analysis  of  Financial  Institutions:  A 
Comparison of Frontier Efficiency Methods. Journal of 
Economics and Business. 50(2):85-114. 
7.  Coelli, T. J., D. S. P. Rao, C. J. O'Donnell, and G. E. 
Battese  (2005)  An  Introduction  to  Efficiency  and 
Productivity Analysis. 2nd ed. Springer, New York. 
8.  Harris, R. and M. Trainor (2005) Capital Subsidies and 
their Impact on Total Factor Productivity: Firm-Level 
Evidence from Northern Ireland*. Journal of Regional 
Science. 45(1):49-74. 
9.  Bergström,  F.  2000.  Capital  Subsidies  and  the 
Performance  of  Firms.  Small  Business  Economics. 
14(3):183-193. 
10.  Taylor,  T.  G.,  H.  E.  Drummond,  and  A.  T.  Gomes 
(1986)  Agricultural  Credit  Programs  and  Production 
Efficiency:  An  Analysis  of  Traditional  Farming  in 
Southeastern Minas Gerais, Brazil. American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics. 68(1):110-119 
11.  Brümmer,  B.  and  J.-P.  Loy.  2000.  The  Technical 
Efficiency Impact of Farm Credit Programmes: A Case   11 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
Study  of  Northern  Germany.  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics. 51(3):405-418. 
12.  Rezitis, A. N., K. Tsiboukas, and S. Tsoukalas (2003) 
Investigation  of  Factors  Influencing  the  Technical 
Efficiency  of  Agricultural  Producers  Participating  in 
Farm Credit Programs: The Case of Greece. Journal of 
Agricultural and Applied Economics. 35(3):529-541. 
13.  Sotnikov, S. (1998) Evaluating the Effects of Price and 
Trade  Liberalisation  on  the  Technical  Efficiency  of 
Agricultural Production in a Transition Economy: The 
Case  of  Russia.  European  Review  of  Agricultural 
Economics. 25(3):412-431. 
14.  Giannakas, K., R. Schoney, and V. Tzouvelekas (2001) 
Technical efficiency, technological change and output 
growth  of  wheat  farms  in  Saskatchewan.  Canadian 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 49(2):135-152. 
15.  Bojnec,  S.  and  L.  Latruffe  (2007)  Determinants  of 
Technical  Efficiency  of  Slovenian  Farms.  in  103rd 
EAAE Seminar. Barcelona, Spain. 
16.  Grazhdaninova, M. and Z. Lerman (2005) Allocative 
and Technical Efficiency of Corporate Farms in Russia. 
Comparative Economic Studies. 47(1):200-213. 
17.  Iraizoz,  B.,  I.  Bardaji,  and  M.  Rapun  (2005)  The 
Spanish beef sector in the 1990s: impact of the BSE 
crisis  on  efficiency  and  profitability.  Applied 
Economics. 37(4):473-484. 
18.  Bakucs,  L.  Z.,  L.  Latruffe,  I.  Ferto,  and  J.  Fogarasi. 
(2006) Technical efficiency of Hungarian farms before 
and  after  accession.  in  Transition  in  Agriculture  – 
Agricultural  Economics  in  Transition  III.  Budapest, 
Hungary. 
19.  Hadley, D. 2006. Patterns in Technical Efficiency and 
Technical  Change  at  the  Farm-level  in  England  and 
Wales, 1982-2002. Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
57(1):81-100. 
20.  Kleinhanss,  W.,  C.  Murillo,  C.  San  Juan,  and  S. 
Sperlich  (2007)  Efficiency,  subsidies,  and 
environmental  adaptation  of  animal  farming  under 
CAP. Agricultural Economics. 36(1):49-65. 
21.  Guyomard, H., L. Latruffe, and C. Le Mouël (2006) 
Technical  efficiency,  technical  progress  and 
productivity change in French agriculture: Do subsidies 
and  farms’  size  matter?  in  96th  EAAE  Seminar. 
Tänikon, Switzerland. 
22.  Oude  Lansink,  A.,  E.  Silva,  and  S.  Stefanou  (2001) 
Inter-Firm and Intra-Firm Efficiency Measures. Journal 
of Productivity Analysis. 15(3):185-199. 
23.  Porter,  M.  E.  (1990)  The  competitive  advantage  of 
nations. The MacMillan Press, London. 
24.  Abdulai, A. and H. Tietje. 2007. Estimating technical 
efficiency  under  unobserved  heterogeneity  with 
stochastic  frontier  models:  application  to  northern 
German dairy farms. European Review of Agricultural 
Economics. 34(3):393-416. 
25.  Lopez,  J.  A.  (2001)  Decoupling:  a  conceptual 
overview. OECD, Paris, France. 
26.  Burfisher, M. E. and J. W. Hopkins. (2003) Decoupled 
payments: household income transfers in contemporary 
U.S. agriculture. USDA-ERS . 
27.  Newbery,  D.  and  J.  Stiglitz.  1981.  The  Theory  of 
Commodity  Price  Stabilisation:  A  Study  in  the 
Economics of Risk. Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
28.  Findeis, J. L. (2002) Subjective equilibrium theory of 
the household: theory revisited and new directions. in 
Workshop  on  the  Farm  Household-Firm  Unit.  Wye 
College, Imperial College, United Kingdom. 
29.  Woldehanna, T., A. O. Lansink, and J. Peerlings. 2000. 
Off-farm work decisions on Dutch cash crop farms and 
the 1992 and Agenda 2000 CAP reforms. Agricultural 
Economics. 22(2):163-171. 
30.  El-Osta, H. S., A. K. Mishra, and M. C. Ahearn. (2004) 
Labor Supply by Farm Operators Under “Decoupled” 
Farm Program Payments. Review of Economics of the 
Household. 2(4):367-385. 
31.  Serra,  T.,  B.  K.  Goodwin,  and  A.  M.  Featherstone. 
2005a.  Agricultural  Policy  Reform  and  Off-farm 
Labour Decisions. Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
56(2):271-285. 
32.  Ahearn, M. C., H. El-Osta, and J. Dewbre. 2006. The 
Impact  of  Coupled  and  Decoupled  Government 
Subsidies  on  Off-Farm  Labor  Participation  of  U.S. 
Farm  Operators.  American  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics. 88(2):393-408. 
33.  Ooms, D. (2007) Micro-Economic Panel Data Models 
for  Dutch  Dairy  Farms.  Wageningen  University  and 
Research Center, Wageningen. 
34.  Hubbard,  R.  G.  (1998)  Capital-Market  Imperfections 
and  Investment.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature. 
36(1):193-225. 
35.  Young,  C.  E.  and  P.  C.  Westcott.  (2000)  How 
Decoupled  is  U.S.  Agricultural  Support  for  Major 
Crops?  American  Journal  of  Agricultural  Economics. 
82(3):762-767. 
36.  Gardebroek,  C.  2004.  Capital  adjustment  patterns  on 
Dutch  pig  farms.  European  Review  of  Agricultural 
Economics. 31(1):39-59. 
37.  Bezlepkina,  I.  V.,  A.  O.  Lansink,  and  A.  J.  Oskam. 
2005.  Effects  of  subsidies  in  Russian  dairy  farming. 
Agricultural Economics. 33(3):277-288. 
38.  Zhengfei, G. and A. Oude Lansink. 2006. The Source 
of  Productivity  Growth  in  Dutch  Agriculture:  A 
Perspective  from  Finance.  American  Journal  of 
Agricultural Economics. 88(3):644-656.   12 
12
th Congress of the European Association of Agricultural Economists – EAAE 2008 
39.  Ahearn, M. C., J. Yee, and P. Korb. 2005. Effects of 
Differing  Farm  Policies  on  Farm  Structure  and 
Dynamics.  American  Journal  of  Agricultural 
Economics. 87(5):1182-1189. 
40.  Goodwin,  B.  K.  and  A.  K.  Mishra  (2006)  Are 
"Decoupled"  Farm  Program  Payments  Really 
Decoupled?  An  Empirical  Evaluation.  American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics. 88(1):73-89. 
41.  Pietola, K., M. Vare, and A. O. Lansink. (2003) Timing 
and type of exit from farming: farmers' early retirement 
programmes  in  Finland.  European  Review  of 
Agricultural Economics. 30(1):99-116. 
42.  Chau, N. H. and H. de Gorter (2005) Disentangling the 
Consequences  of  Direct  Payment  Schemes  in 
Agriculture  on  Fixed  Costs,  Exit  Decisions,  and 
Output. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
87(5):1174-1181. 
43.  Moschini,  G.  and  P.  Sckokai  (1994)  Efficiency  of 
Decoupled  Farm  Programs  under  Distortionary 
Taxation. American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
76(3):362-370. 
44.  Serra,  T.,  D.  Zilberman,  B.  K.  Goodwin,  and  K. 
Hyvonen  (2005b)  Replacement  of  Agricultural  Price 
Supports by Area Payments in the European Union and 
the  Effects  on  Pesticide  Use.  American  Journal  of 
Agricultural Economics. 87(4):870-884. 
45.  Färe,  R.  and  D.  Primont  (1995)  Multi-Output 
Production and Duality: Theory and Applications. 2nd 
ed.  Kluiwer  Academic  Publisher,  Boston, 
Massachusetts. 
46.  Coelli,  T.  and  S.  Perelman  (1999)  A  comparison  of 
parametric and non-parametric distance functions: With 
application to European railways. European Journal of 
Operational Research. 117(2):326-339. 
47.  Fuentes, H. J., E. Grifell-Tatjé, and S. Perelman (2001) 
A  Parametric  Distance  Function  Approach  for 
Malmquist  Productivity  Index  Estimation.  Journal  of 
Productivity Analysis. 15(2):79-94. 
48.  Kumbhakar, S., S. Ghosh, and J. T. McGuckin (1991) 
A  Generalized  Production  Frontier  Approach  for 
Estimating Determinants of Inefficiency in U.S. Dairy 
Farms.  Journal  of  Business  &  Economic  Statistics. 
9(3):279-286. 
49.  Battese,  G.  E.  and  T.  J.  Coelli  (1995)  A  model  for 
technical  inefficiency  effects  in  a  stochastic  frontier 
production  function  for  panel  data.  Empirical 
Economics. 20(2):325-332. 
50.  Kumbhakar, S. and C. A. K. Lovell (2000) Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis. 3rd ed. Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge. 
51.  Wang,  H.-J.  (2002)  Heteroscedasticity  and  Non-
Monotonic Efficiency Effects of a Stochastic Frontier 
Model.  Journal  of  Productivity  Analysis.  18(3):241-
253. 
52.  Wilson,  P.,  D.  Hadley,  and  C.  Asby  (2001)  The 
influence  of  management  characteristics  on  the 
technical  efficiency  of  wheat  farmers  in  eastern 




·  Author:  Xueqin Zhu   
·  Institute:  Wageningen University   
·  Street:  Hollandseweg 1 
·  City: Wageningen   
·  Country: Netherlands     





Appendix 1 Livestock subsidies and total subsidies in three countries in 1995-2004 
 
    1995  1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Average 
Livestock  1181  2218  1270  1094  902  1785  2592  3363  3537  7371  2662  GE 
Total  13695  14728  14329  14249  12194  13159  14211  18095  19159  22504  15877 
Livestock  442  521  995  450  327  990  1709  2595  2741  8824  1925  NL 
Total  3394  3130  3011  2970  3191  4001  6489  7752  8240  13791  5520 
Livestock  0  2401  7529  6515  7158  2083  3006  3424  3210  9594  4622  SW 
Total  10046  10159  19742  20146  21547  26753  28449  29707  28204  29363  23090 
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Appendix 2  Estimation results 
 
Germany 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln ( milk)             
Ln (variable inputs)  0.83216  0.11108  7.49  0  0.61444  1.04988 
Ln (capital)  0.56635  0.08737  6.48  0  0.39509  0.73760 
Ln (labour)  0.51810  0.13329  3.89  0  0.25685  0.77935 
Ln (land)  0.58154  0.10759  5.41  0  0.37067  0.79241 
Ln (other products/milk)  0.10838  0.05837  1.86  0.063  -0.00602  0.22279 
Time  0.04888  0.01523  3.21  0.001  0.01903  0.07874 
Ln (variable inputs)**2  0.02588  0.00825  3.14  0.002  0.00972  0.04204 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (capital)  0.00000  0.01086  0  1  -0.02129  0.02128 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (labour)  -0.07503  0.01405  -5.34  0  -0.10258  -0.04749 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (land)  -0.03688  0.01277  -2.89  0.004  -0.06191  -0.01185 
Ln (variable inputs)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.04983  0.00646  -7.72  0  -0.06248  -0.03717 
Ln (capital)**2  -0.02104  0.00442  -4.76  0  -0.02971  -0.01237 
Ln (capital)* Ln (labour)  0.00083  0.01181  0.07  0.944  -0.02232  0.02397 
Ln (capital)* Ln (land)   -0.00972  0.01099  -0.88  0.377  -0.03125  0.01182 
Ln (capital)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  0.00598  0.00554  1.08  0.28  -0.00487  0.01683 
Ln (labour)**2  -0.00208  0.00915  -0.23  0.82  -0.02001  0.01585 
Ln (labour)* Ln (land)   0.01172  0.01394  0.84  0.4  -0.01561  0.03905 
Ln (labour)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.01503  0.00667  -2.25  0.024  -0.02810  -0.00197 
Ln (land)**2  -0.02462  0.00814  -3.02  0.002  -0.04057  -0.00866 
Ln (land )*  
Ln (other products/milk)  0.02442  0.00601  4.06  0  0.01264  0.03619 
Ln (other products/milk)**2   -0.04372  0.00333  -13.12  0  -0.05026  -0.03719 
Time* Ln (variable inputs)  0.00341  0.00152  2.24  0.025  0.00042  0.00639 
Time* Ln (capital)  -0.00610  0.00129  -4.72  0  -0.00863  -0.00356 
Time* Ln (labour)  -0.00094  0.00160  -0.59  0.556  -0.00408  0.00219 
Time*Ln (land)  -0.00676  0.00139  -4.86  0  -0.00948  -0.00404 
Time* Ln (other products/milk)  -0.00089  0.00074  -1.2  0.228  -0.00235  0.00056 
Time_square  0.00151  0.00024  6.18  0  0.00103  0.00199 
Constant  -3.73514  0.59236  -6.31  0  -4.89614  -2.57414 
u             
Livestock subsidy  0.00048  0.00008  6.4  0  0.00034  0.00063 
Decoupled subsidy  0.01866  0.00028  65.66  0  0.01811  0.01922 
Farm size  -0.00400  0.00012  -34.05  0  -0.00423  -0.00377 
Specialization degree  -0.00836  0.00066  -12.73  0  -0.00965  -0.00707 
Family labour  0.00081  0.00011  7.41  0  0.00059  0.00102 
Rented land  -0.00039  0.00006  -6.88  0  -0.00051  -0.00028 
Long-term debt  0.00010  0.00009  1.1  0.273  -0.00008  0.00027 
Short-term debt  0.00048  0.00012  4.11  0  0.00025  0.00071 
time  -0.00212  0.00451  -0.47  0.638  -0.01095  0.00671 
Constant   1.13919  0.07107  16.03  0  0.99989  1.27850 
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Netherlands 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln ( milk)             
Ln (variable inputs)  1.68688  0.19079  8.84  0  1.31294  2.06081 
Ln (capital)  0.66136  0.16778  3.94  0  0.33251  0.99021 
Ln (labour)  0.60772  0.24773  2.45  0.014  0.12219  1.09325 
Ln (land)  0.43404  0.18717  2.32  0.02  0.06720  0.80089 
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.32923  0.07946  -4.14  0  -0.48496  -0.17350 
Time  -0.03163  0.02548  -1.24  0.215  -0.08158  0.01831 
Ln (variable inputs)**2  0.03642  0.01757  2.07  0.038  0.00197  0.07086 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (capital)  -0.06748  0.02556  -2.64  0.008  -0.11758  -0.01739 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (labour)  -0.07754  0.03010  -2.58  0.01  -0.13653  -0.01856 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (land)  -0.15350  0.02307  -6.65  0  -0.19871  -0.10829 
Ln (variable inputs)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.00210  0.01057  -0.2  0.842  -0.02281  0.01861 
Ln (capital)**2  -0.00789  0.01237  -0.64  0.524  -0.03214  0.01637 
Ln (capital)* Ln (labour)  -0.01158  0.02553  -0.45  0.65  -0.06162  0.03847 
Ln (capital)* Ln (land)   0.04667  0.02236  2.09  0.037  0.00284  0.09050 
Ln (capital)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.00640  0.00988  -0.65  0.517  -0.02576  0.01296 
Ln (labour)**2  -0.01243  0.01826  -0.68  0.496  -0.04822  0.02335 
Ln (labour)* Ln (land)   0.09172  0.02689  3.41  0.001  0.03901  0.14442 
Ln (labour)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  0.02336  0.01182  1.98  0.048  0.00019  0.04653 
Ln (land)**2  -0.07072  0.01430  -4.95  0  -0.09875  -0.04269 
Ln (land )*  
Ln (other products/milk)  0.00040  0.00963  0.04  0.967  -0.01849  0.01928 
Ln (other products/milk)**2   -0.03846  0.00420  -9.16  0  -0.04669  -0.03023 
Time* Ln (variable inputs)  0.00244  0.00301  0.81  0.418  -0.00346  0.00834 
Time* Ln (capital)  0.00028  0.00286  0.1  0.923  -0.00534  0.00589 
Time* Ln (labour)  -0.00340  0.00334  -1.02  0.31  -0.00995  0.00316 
Time*Ln (land)  0.00899  0.00266  3.38  0.001  0.00378  0.01421 
Time* Ln (other products/milk)  0.00257  0.00120  2.15  0.032  0.00022  0.00491 
Time_square  0.00144  0.00036  4  0  0.00073  0.00215 
Constant  -6.57220  1.02803  -6.39  0  -8.58711  -4.55730 
u             
Livestock subsidy  0.00046  0.00008  6.08  0  0.00031  0.00060 
Decoupled subsidy  0.01561  0.00098  15.87  0  0.01368  0.01754 
Farm size  -0.00305  0.00012  -26.12  0  -0.00328  -0.00282 
Specialization degree  -0.00895  0.00071  -12.67  0  -0.01034  -0.00757 
Family labour  -0.00046  0.00023  -2  0.046  -0.00092  -0.00001 
Rented land  0.00027  0.00008  3.31  0.001  0.00011  0.00042 
Long-term debt  -0.00063  0.00014  -4.46  0  -0.00090  -0.00035 
Short-term debt  0.00323  0.00066  4.9  0  0.00194  0.00453 
time  -0.03412  0.00706  -4.83  0  -0.04796  -0.02028 
Constant  1.89565  0.09057  20.93  0  1.71814  2.07316 
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Sweden 
  Coef.  Std. Err.  z  P>|z|  [95% Conf. Interval] 
Ln ( milk)             
Ln (variable inputs)  0.63563  0.18278  3.48  0.001  0.27738  0.99388 
Ln (capital)  -0.26957  0.15853  -1.7  0.089  -0.58028  0.04113 
Ln (labour)  0.78832  0.21295  3.7  0  0.37094  1.20570 
Ln (land)  0.20980  0.13987  1.5  0.134  -0.06435  0.48394 
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.38626  0.09671  -3.99  0  -0.57581  -0.19672 
Time  0.05475  0.02873  1.91  0.057  -0.00156  0.11107 
Ln (variable inputs)**2  0.02655  0.01721  1.54  0.123  -0.00718  0.06029 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (capital)  -0.07614  0.02343  -3.25  0.001  -0.12206  -0.03022 
Ln (variable inputs)*Ln (labour)  0.05969  0.02758  2.16  0.03  0.00564  0.11374 
Ln (variable inputs)* Ln (land)  -0.02775  0.01774  -1.56  0.118  -0.06253  0.00703 
Ln (variable inputs)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.00974  0.01200  -0.81  0.417  -0.03326  0.01377 
Ln (capital)**2  0.08031  0.01371  5.86  0  0.05343  0.10718 
Ln (capital)* Ln (labour)  -0.03534  0.02357  -1.5  0.134  -0.08153  0.01086 
Ln (capital)* Ln (land)   -0.03515  0.01696  -2.07  0.038  -0.06839  -0.00191 
Ln (capital)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  -0.01479  0.00984  -1.5  0.133  -0.03407  0.00448 
Ln (labour)**2  -0.06222  0.01620  -3.84  0  -0.09398  -0.03046 
Ln (labour)* Ln (land)   0.07629  0.02176  3.51  0  0.03364  0.11894 
Ln (labour)*  
Ln (other products/milk)  0.01269  0.01408  0.9  0.367  -0.01490  0.04029 
Ln (land)**2  -0.03721  0.00731  -5.09  0  -0.05154  -0.02288 
Ln (land )*  
Ln (other products/milk)  0.03010  0.00821  3.67  0  0.01401  0.04620 
Ln (other products/milk)**2   -0.06582  0.00299  -22  0  -0.07169  -0.05996 
Time* Ln (variable inputs)  -0.01413  0.00403  -3.5  0  -0.02203  -0.00622 
Time* Ln (capital)  0.00890  0.00293  3.03  0.002  0.00315  0.01465 
Time* Ln (labour)  -0.00921  0.00386  -2.39  0.017  -0.01676  -0.00165 
Time*Ln (land)  0.01224  0.00295  4.14  0  0.00645  0.01802 
Time* Ln (other products/milk)  -0.00745  0.00181  -4.11  0  -0.01100  -0.00390 
Time_square  0.00082  0.00052  1.58  0.114  -0.00020  0.00184 
Constant  -1.92086  0.85691  -2.24  0.025  -3.60037  -0.24134 
u             
Livestock subsidy  0.00001  0.00025  0.02  0.984  -0.00048  0.00049 
Decoupled subsidy  0.02062  0.00081  25.51  0  0.01904  0.02221 
Farm size  -0.00318  0.00043  -7.33  0  -0.00404  -0.00233 
Specialization degree  -0.00331  0.00105  -3.17  0.002  -0.00536  -0.00126 
Family labour  0.00070  0.00054  1.3  0.195  -0.00036  0.00175 
Rented land  -0.00086  0.00017  -5.06  0  -0.00120  -0.00053 
Long-term debt  0.00032  0.00031  1.03  0.302  -0.00029  0.00093 
Short-term debt  0.00057  0.00068  0.83  0.406  -0.00077  0.00191 
time  0.00373  0.00495  0.75  0.451  -0.00597  0.01344 
Slattbygdslan  0.14270  0.01920  7.43  0  0.10507  0.18032 
Sachsen-Anhalt  0.07536  0.01757  4.29  0  0.04093  0.10979 
Constant  0.14146  0.10593  1.34  0.182  -0.06617  0.34908 
 